1	SUPREME COURT: NEW YORK COUNTY. TRIAL TERM: PART 71
2	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
3	IND.#: 02721/2009
4	-against- CHARGE: 190.79-03
5	RAPHAEL GOLB
6	Defendant. SENTENCE X
7	100 Centre Street
8	New York, New York 10013
9	November 18, 2010
10	1.676
11	BEFORE: HONORABLE CAROL BERKMAN Justice of the Supreme Court
12	
13	APPEARANCES:
14	FOR THE PEOPLE:
15	CYRUS R. VANCE, JR. ESQ.
16	New York County District Attorney One Hogan Place
17	New York, New York 10013 BY: DAVID BANDLER, ESQ.
18	Assistant District Attorney
19	FOR THE DEFENDANT:
20	DAVID BREITBART, ESQ.
21	RONALD KUBY, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendant
22	
23	
24	Theresa Magniccari Senior Court Reporter
25	

THE CLERK: Calendar Number 3, Raphael Golb.
MR. BANDLER: David Bandler, B-A-N-D-L-E-R, for
the People.
Good morning.
MR. BREITBART: For the defendant, Raphael Golb,
David Breitbart, 152 West 57th Street.
MR. KUBY: And Ronald Kuby, K-U-B-Y, 1119 West
23rd Street.
THE COURT: Okay.
I don't have all of the letters in front of me.
My recollection is that Mr. Kuby pointed out that I have
reserved on Count 1 and something else.
MR. KUBY: That you had reserved on Count 1 in
the motion for a trial order of dismissal that we made at
the close of the People's case and that you, in fact, did
not rule on the renewed motion as to all counts that we
made at the conclusion of all the evidence, that's
correct.
THE COURT: And did you wish to be heard
further?
MR. KUBY: No, Judge, we'll rest on our papers and
the record.
THE COURT: And you, Mr. Bandler?
MR. BANDLER: Similarly, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

1	In that case, I will deny those motions.
2	I have another legal question, you protested, Mr.
3	Kuby, in your last correspondence, to, I guess the third
4	condition that the People suggested, and so I assume it's D
5	that you have your objection to?
6	MR. KUBY: That's correct.
7	I first have a question about it.
8	I object to it no matter what it means, but
9	grammatically it would seem to suggest that Mr. Golb is
10	prohibited from soliciting, requesting, aiding, and those
11	other words in the first clause, anyone else to communicate
12	about any of the victims. Grammatically that is what it
13	suggests.
14	Logically, though, I find it hard to imagine that
15	the prosecutor wants to prevent Mr. Golb from asking other
16	people to talk about the so-called victims while at the
17	same time allowing him to do so.
18	So not for the first time in this Court in this
19	case logically grammar seems at war with each other.
20	You remember the last fight we had about the
21	comma, Judge?
22	THE COURT: Mr. Kuby, we had so many fights.
23	MR. KUBY: It was about the comma.
24	THE COURT: The comma, yes, I do remember that.
25	MR. KUBY: You see, I don't know what it means,

but I object to it under either meaning. 1 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bandler. 2 MR. BANDLER: First, I will say I have not seen 3 any correspondence about Paragraph 3. 4 I don't think it will help you. It 5 THE COURT: didn't help me, which I didn't like. 6 MR. KUBY: This is a longer legal argument, including a constitutional amendment, I throw in as well. 8 I am sorry I faxed it to you yesterday. 9 MR. BANDLER: Paragraph 3; really, the Orders of 10 Protection, I assume, are going to prohibit the defendant 11 from doing a number of things including this third party 12 harassment against the victims. Paragraph 3 and the Orders 13 of Protection will also say "no third party contact," "no 14 contact whatsoever." 15 We're all aware of the rules of accessorial 16 liability for conduct of others. Paragraph 3 just says the 17 defendant cannot solicit or request other people to do what 18 the defendant can't. 19 So the defendant is not allowed to e-mail victims 20 or e-mail about victims or blog about victims. Defendant 21 is not allowed to ask other people to do that. 22 That's not accurate. He is allowed to THE COURT: 23 do it in his own name or anonymously because the crime of 24 which he is found guilty on this case is using specific 25

other names for that purpose, a few other elements, but I won't bother.

MR. BANDLER: So we'll modify Sub D to say that he can't solicit other people to do those things anonymously except under those conditions.

MR. KUBY: Get rid of Sub D is what we'll do and it achieves what Mr. Bandler wants to achieve, trampling all over the First Amendment. It only sort of scuffs the First Amendment.

THE COURT: Please don't take my silence as agreement.

MR. KUBY: Me, I never would do that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I don't offhand see any problem with getting rid of Sub D because it seems to me there is an umbrella here that says the defendant may not solicit, request, aid or cause another person to act in violation of this Order of Protection, which is an umbrella clause which covers it. I don't know what B means exactly to any of the additional conditions set forth by the Court.

MR. BANDLER: For example, Paragraphs 1 and 2 -THE COURT: Okay. That's why I didn't know what
it meant. I meant for paragraphs 1 and 2 to be part of the
Order of Protection. So I was little confused about that.
I am not easily confused.

MR. BANDLER: Okay. The way they have that form
set up -THE COURT: It doesn't fit in there.

MR. BANDLER: Okay. I understand.

THE COURT: It would have to be as an addendum.

MR. BANDLER: That's what I meant also.

THE COURT: Okay.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So defendant is before this Court for sentence on his convictions; the two counts of identity theft in the second degree; aggravated harassment in the second degree as to Schiffman; criminal impersonation in the second degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; criminal impersonation in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; another count of criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; aggravated harassment in the second degree;

criminal impersonation in the second degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree; another count of criminal impersonation in the second degree; forgery in the third degree; aggravated harassment in the second degree; criminal impersonation in the second degree -- excuse me -strike that last part -- criminal impersonation, that was an acquittal, and unauthorized use of a computer.

8

7

6

Do the People wish to be heard?

Your Honor, the defendant should get exactly what

9

MR. BANDLER: Yes, your Honor.

10

he deserves, not a tiny bit less. He should get no 11

12

leniency. His conduct, as he stands convicted of it,

or thousands of hours of malicious harassment and

13

consisted of hundreds of individual acts. A course of

14

conduct over a period of many months, even years, hundreds

15

impersonation.

16

He has had hundreds of opportunities to abandon 17

18 19 his scheme, or to mitigate the harm, or apologize, or show He never did. There was a full trial before your

20

The Court heard all the evidence and heard from all

21

The defendant was found guilty on 30 counts, the victims.

22

two felonies and 28 misdemeanors; two counts of identity

23

theft in the second degree, three counts of aggravated

24

harassment in the second degree as to three separate victims, 14 counts of criminal impersonation in the second

25

degree as to four different victims, forgery in the third degree as to the four victims, and unauthorized use of a computer regarding the NYU computer systems, and he used therein that protocol address to commit crimes in their computers.

The defendant was convicted of conduct directed against five people. The most egregious was his actions against Dr. Schiffman; impersonation plus a malicious smear campaign designed to destroy Dr. Schiffman's career. And it wasn't a one time act, it was a course of conduct. He didn't log onto that impersonating account one time, but dozens of times. He didn't send impersonating e-mails to one person, but to dozens of people, and it was coupled with blogs, e-mails under other anonymous aliases to hundreds of people.

And while the defendant testified he is a whistle blower about plagiarism, the evidence before this Court demonstrated an e-mail from this defendant saying he didn't care about the plagiarism thing.

Other victims the defendant was convicted of targeting included Dr. Robert Cargill, Dr. Frank Cross, Dr. Stephen Goranson and Dr. Jonathan Seidel.

Defendant was acquitted of impersonating Dr. Jeffrey Gibson.

The People are still requesting an Order of

1.4

Protection as to Dr. Gibson. There was evidence that the defendant did open an e-mail account in the name Jeffrey Gibson. The defendant admitted that. So we are asking for an Order of Protection as to Dr. Gibson as well.

There was evidence that the defendant targeted others in the world of the Dead Sea Scrolls. He should get no leniency, just what he deserves.

Now, he put the People to their full burden and he is entitled to do that, but in so doing he has done nothing to earn any form of leniency. He refused to stipulate to anything, not even to business records, not even to the fact that Dr. Frank Cross, who is in a nursing home, didn't give the defendant permission to open an e-mail account in his name. And that stipulation would not have prejudiced their defense at all. It's a fact they did not dispute.

All of these refusals to stipulate turned this into a three week trial. The People called 22 witnesses, including nine from out of state, at a tremendous expense to the People. Witnesses were flown in from Oregon and California and lodged, and it was a burden to the witnesses, many of whom have extremely busy schedules.

Dr. Seidel came from Oregon. He came one day and left the next. He had to rearrange his schedule. Dr. Cross' daughter, she had to come from Rochester and go

back in one day. Many corporations had to send representatives who were taken out from their normal duties for one or more days. All for facts the defendant ultimately conceded.

The Court heard the impact this had on the victims.

Now, he is entitled to put the People to their full burden, but now that he has been found guilty of 30 counts, he should bear the full consequences of his actions and get exactly what he deserves.

The defendant testified, and he lied on the stand. As evidenced by the jury's verdict, they did not believe him at all. And he has told so many different stories from during the commission of the crime, after arrest, and on the stand, you can't credit anything he says.

But worse is that he lied under oath in Court. He's an attorney, so theoretically he should know better.

I want to point out a couple of things he was untruthful about. He lied about his arrest and the statement he gave to law enforcement. He made up facts about what the investigators and myself, the Assistant District Attorney, told him.

And part of his lies was that the investigators coerced him into giving a statement, and the credible testimony of the investigators as well as the video

statement itself shows that what the defendant said on the stand was not true. And I would submit the attorneys knew that also because they could have asked for a voluntariness charge from the Court, and they did not.

And I submit they did not in order to make that issue immaterial to the trial, in order to shield the defendant from a potential perjury charge.

Defendant tailored his testimony to what he had hearing during the trial.

For example, Miss Delfavero from NYU, in charge of computer security, Mr. Kuby was trying to get her to admit Mr. Kuby's theory was true. Mr. Kuby's theory was that everybody forges G-mail, e-mail accounts. That everybody knows that they're fictitious and forged and that a real verifiable e-mail address would have an NYU EDU domain. That was Mr. Kuby's point, which the defendant, I am sure, believed and Miss Delfavero corrected him. She said, no, you can't forge an NYU EDU. Then she explained how.

Then when he, the defendant testified, oh, no, I wasn't intending to trick anyone into believing it was Dr. Schiffman. If I had, I would have used an NYU dot EDU domain. He manufactured that, fabricated that based upon the trial testimony, not based on the truth.

Now, another example is Dean Stimpson. Dean

Stimpson testified one reason she knew that that forged e-mail was forged, one reason was that there was a small "p" in professor where it was signed Professor Schiffman.

Then when the defendant testified, he said, oh, it was a parody, I was intending to let people know it was a parody because I put a small "p" there.

Again, manufactured and tailored testimony.

Once defendant heard that the evidence at trial was conclusive as to his identity, he decided he had to testify, and that's why he made up why he did it. He made up what his intent was. He was trying to fool the jury, but they saw through it.

According to the defendant, this is about free speech, but in reality only as long as defendant is speaking, only as long as it's no one else speaking out against his theories or his father's theories. And according to him, his free speech rights allow him to harass and impersonate others, and the jury found differently. It was their factual determination what was in the defendant's mind, and they found that the defendant was deliberately and with criminal intent harassing, impersonating and forging and assuming identities.

The evidence overwhelmingly proved his guilt. He is guilty of 30 counts, including two Class E felonies. He

		1
	1	
	2	
	3	
	4	
	5	
	6	
	7	ŀ
	8	
	9	
1	0	
1	1	
1	2	į
1	3	
1	4	٠
1	5	
1	6	
1	7	
1	8	
1	9	
2	0	
2	1	
2	2	
2	3	

25

has not accepted responsibility at any stage. His entire course of conduct was based on deception and lies and he has used every opportunity to continue to smear and attack the victims, either directly or indirectly, through his attorneys. In motion practices he attacked the victims, and continued to attack them. And the motions have been promptly posted online. Statements to the press before, during and after trial have attacked the victims. The trial testimony, including the opening, cross examination, the defendant's testimony and summation, all continue to attack the victims.

He showed no remorse at any time and continues to blame others, including the victims, the District Attorney's office and the Court for his own conduct.

But what the defendant has done by continuing to attack the victims is take advantage of litigation privileges. Because he is in this litigation, he uses those protections to continue to attack the victims, doing stuff he was afraid to do under his own name.

Defendants frequently earn leniency at sentencing all the time. They plead guilty and spare the victims, the People and the Court the expense and time of a trial. They accept responsibility. They accept their guilt. They earn leniency for stipulating. They earn leniency for not lying under oath. If their choice is either to lie under

oath or to admit their guilt, they could choose to exercise their right to remain silent.

But here he has earned no leniency whatsoever. His conduct shows he'll go to any lengths to engage in deception to try to excuse himself. So he should get exactly what he deserves, not a day less and not a dollar less. If he thinks his conduct is okay, he is likely to commit the same crimes again. So only a significant punishment, followed by significant supervision, backed by an appropriate deterrent with that supervision could both punish and stop him and deter him from doing it again.

For those reasons, your Honor, the People recommend a net sentence of one-and-one-third to four years state prison, a \$20,000 fine, and full and final Orders of Protection for Dr. Schiffman, Dr. Cargill, Dr. Cross, Dr. Goranson, Dr. Seidel and Dr. Gibson, whose account there was an acquittal on, including the conditions on the Orders of Protection as set forth by the Court.

And with that sentence, he'll be eligible for parole very soon, and that maximum term of four years ensures that he will be under parole supervision.

And if the Court felt he deserved any leniency, I would submit the way to grant him leniency would be to reduce the minimum term to one year, make it one to four.

The People submit he does not deserve any

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

leniency. Such a sentence of one-and-one-third to four gives him the incentive to accept responsibility and change his conduct. It gives the government the tools to properly supervise him and punish him if he offends again.

The fine, I submit, is nothing given the amount he has been able to spend on criminal representation. could pay a fine.

In sum, he should get exactly the punishment he deserves, not a day less, not a dollar less.

It's one-and-one-third to four years state prison, \$20,000 fine, and it's full and final Orders of Protection.

Thank you.

Judge, I have been trying cases MR. BREITBART: for a long time, over 40 years. For Mr. Bandler to suggest a punishment in this case should be predicated upon trial theory attributes fault to Raphael Golb, but it's not his If there were determinations that were made with regard to stipulations or no stipulations, for the 40 some years that I have been trying cases I've never stipulated to anything and I continue to carry that as a theory to use during the trial of the case.

But Raphael Golb had nothing to do with making a decision with regard to stipulations in this case. was a determination that was made by counsel for the

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

1.8

1.9

20

21

22

23

24

25

To punish him for that would be totally wrong. defense. Raphael Golb is not a trial lawyer. He does real estate closings and he was constantly guided by counsel.

My reading of Mr. Golb's testimony is not that he perjured himself, he scrupulously and carefully told the What I read, what I heard was that Rapahel Golb did not believe he committed a crime, not that he was lying about the crimes. And I find myself stuck on responding to what Mr. Bandler said because what he said is an outrageous attempt to get this Court to incarcerate Mr. Golb. not the purpose of the sentence, as I understand it.

He also talked about defendant testifying falsely, the NYU EDU account was proof that he did not intend to impersonate.

If your Honor's recalls, in the motions, in the Franks motion almost a year before DelFavero testified, Mr. Kuby argued that the fact that defendant used the G-mail rather than an NYU EDU account was proof that he did not intend to impersonate. It's again giving credit to Mr. Golb for something that Mr. Kuby wrote in the motion a year ago, something that I decided was part of the theory of defense.

I didn't come here with the intent of attacking the People's case from an evidentiary point of view, but the only witness that perjured themselves was Dr.

ے

Schiffman. He perjured himself and it became apparent when the Golb book was put into evidence and when he denied ever having been accused of writing something that was the work of someone else, but I don't think that's the point.

I think the point is what would be a fair and just sentence at this stage based upon the uniqueness, and I most respectfully suggest Raphael Golb is a unique defendant in the Supreme Court of New York County in the Criminal Court. His background up to a couple of years ago was exemplary, your Honor. Fifty years old, he's never been in trouble. He's never done anything to offend the statutes or the Courts or anyone else. Brilliant scholar. Graduated with an undergraduate degree from Oberlin and a PhD from Harvard. He has a law degree from NYU. An incredible background. I wish I could stockpile some of that for my next case or the one after that or the one after that. He's got an exemplary background. He's never been in trouble before. He's never had a problem.

I think what's obvious and dispositive is that your Honor gave him instructions when he was arraigned that he was not to in any way violate the rules with regard to e-mailing or blogging with regard to any of the individuals. The Orders of Protection, they have been scrupulously followed. He has not done anything to violate

2

3

4

5 6

7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

He has been in court religiously whenever it those orders. was mandated that he be here. He has shown the Court the greatest respect with regard to that.

We're sorry that the government had to spend money making this case, but that's what the system is about. That's what the system is about, putting the People to their proof.

Now, in all the years that I have been trying cases I recall that there were three basic principles with regard to the concept of sentencing. Sentencing is supposed to send a message to the community at large that this conduct should not be engaged in. Sentencing is supposed to rehabilitate a defendant and give him an opportunity to think about what he has done before. And sentencing also is a punishment for the actions that were done by the individual.

I most respectfully suggest that there has been a loud and clear message sent with regard to the use of the internet as a result of the way this case has been tried. The message is very, very clear, don't send an e-mail when you impersonate someone else, where you use someone else's The fact that the message has gotten out is clear. It's been in all of the newspapers the gentle persons are here to perpetuate.

THE COURT: Gentle persons?

2

3 4

5 6

7

8

9 10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

Some are much MR. BREITBART: Gentle persons. more gentle than others and some much more attractive than others.

THE COURT: Mr. Breitbart, we grow too soon old and too late smart. So gentle persons is to include the staff members of the person and gentle persons is an expression. So we don't need to talk about people's looks and we don't need to talk about things like that because it's inappropriate. That has nothing to do with Mr. Golb. So let's just make that clear. Don't do that, please.

MR. BREITBART: He is very bright, Judge. is told not to do something, he understands and he follows The idea of rehabilitating this scholar that instruction. by putting him in Rikers Island for a year just doesn't make sense to this observer. That's not what we're supposed to do. If the purpose is merely to punish him, if the purpose is merely to while him into obedience, that is, of course, an alternative that is available to the Court, but it's one that none of the professionals saw fit to use as an example that is necessary.

This morning we were given a copy of the probation report, and I would like to point out that not only does the Probation Department recommend probation in this case, but none of the alleged victims suggest that incarceration

is appropriate.

And I most respectfully suggest that I don't often want to follow the mandates of the Probation Department, but I believe in this particular case the Court should follow that suggestion from the Probation Department.

They had an opportunity to speak to him. They say that he was cooperative. He gave them whatever materials they asked for. They have researched obviously in their professional way thousands of cases, and this case where my client has a PhD, a law degree and a Bachelor's degree, where he is a scholar, where his activities in addition to blogging and e-mailing include dance and drumming, I most respectfully suggest that incarceration would be the wrong thing to do. I think it would be dangerous.

Raphael Golb weighs 120 pounds, that speaks very, very loudly to me. I have spent a lot of time at Rikers Island. I wouldn't want to go there as a 50 year old who weighs 120 pounds. But I am sure that your Honor has listened very carefully when Mr. Golb was on the stand and you heard a great deal about him. You got an opportunity to see who and what he is. He was fighting a cause. And the District Attorney of New York County has determined that that was an illegal way of going about sending a message that he felt that he had to send.

I would ask the Court not to follow the mandate or

the suggestion that Raphael Golb be incarcerated.

If in spite of my plea, in spite of my arguments in rebutting the arguments made by Mr. Bandler, I most respectfully suggest that if your Honor decides that incarceration is an appropriate sentence in this case, that your Honor not set the surrender date until the 29th of November, which would be after Thanksgiving, so that he could have Thanksgiving dinner with his folks.

Thank you for listening so carefully, Judge.

THE COURT: You know, since this trial there was something in the press about a letter written by Lawrence Trib and some revival of some blogs with regard to alleged plagiarism by a number of Harvard law professors, which I probably would have skipped it but for the fact that I just tried this case, and I was very bemused by the contrast or the page after page of text quoted in those blogs as opposed to the sentence or two that Mr. Golb is so concerned with.

I don't think I have the equipment to determine whether or not what Mr. Golb says is plagiarism or not. I have my views on the subject, but I think it requires at the end more knowledge of what is done in the academic community and more knowledge of this area of scholarship than I have for my light reading on the subject, so I do not go there.

You know, as I said, I have a point of view that's private and not judicial on the subject.

Now, as much as the defense insisted that the trial here was about speech, the defendant was, in fact, convicted for conduct, and it was conduct which constituted a deliberate invasion of the substantial privacy interest of these victims, as the jury found, whom he intentionally imitated to their detriment and to his benefit in an essentially intolerable manner. So this is not about the victims being tainted, although they apparently are, and it's not about what Mr. Golb said, the contents of his speech, but what he did, so it's not his words but his conduct and the rules with regard to that are set forth in People against Slash, 86 NY 2d, and People against Mangano at 100 NY 2d.

So I gather also that there is a pending case in the Supreme Court in the United Sates about offense of speech, but that case has nothing to do with this one.

In New York, as Mr. Kuby says, it maybe mundane, but we get insulted before breakfast, but it is still a crime to imitate people in the manner that the defendant did.

I think People against Johnson at 208 Appellate Division 2d 1051 is interesting on that subject.

The fact that he did it with words, that the

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

words showed his intent, the Supreme Court of the United States has also said does not make it a First Amendment case.

Now, I think you're right, Mr. Breitbart, it is inappropriate for a Court to sentence somebody based upon his insistence on his constitutional rights, the trial strategy. I never seen a case that quite put it that way. I see a gray area here in a way because the defendant's trial strategy was there before the lawyers entered the Defendant's trial strategy was set forth in the defendant's statement to Mr. Bandler in great part, but he is entitled to go to trial and he is entitled to have a strategy.

Of course, the Court may premise its sentence on perjury because that's clear, that's not a gray area at all. It's the refusal to stipulate, the decision to go to trial, the theory that the defendant set forth in his statement to Mr. Bandler, it's at least in the area, if not on the other side of the line, and I did not rely on it.

I do think that by the jury's verdict there was a clear finding that Mr. Golb's testimony was untruthful in a number of important respects, because he didn't simply say "I don't believe I committed a crime." He said, "I did not intend certain actions," and the jury plainly rejected that

portion of the testimony. And I do not want to discuss the rest of the details that Mr. Bandler referred to. I have nothing further to say about the claim that Dr. Schiffman perjured himself.

I find this a troubling case to sentence because, of course, it is a crime that does not involve actual physical violence, but the kind of violence this invasion of privacy, and obviously in the probation report, still echoes it. The victims felt invaded and hurt by this. Nevertheless, Mr. Kuby had rushed in, just because their feelings are hurt, too bad for them. Again, this is conduct. I simply mention this because it has to do with what kind of crime this is.

I despair for various reasons, which I think are clear in the face of the entire record, and I won't recount here, of Mr. Golb's ceasing this behavior, but I will put a period on that and strike the but.

I think accordingly there needs to be a clear message as to the consequences of his continuing in such behavior.

On each felony, he is sentenced to a term of six months concurrent with five years probation.

On each misdemeanor, he is sentenced to a term of three months concurrent with three years of probation.

All terms to run concurrently.

Special terms of probation and attendant to the Order of Protection are as we have discussed:

One: The defendant may not attend a lecture, seminar or other program at which Professor Lawrence Schiffman, Professor Robert Cargill or Stephen Goranson is a featured participant, presenter or participant unless said lecture, seminar, or other program is held in a venue designed for an audience of at least one hundred (100) people.

Two: The defendant may not have indirect contact with Professor Lawrence Schiffman, Professor Robert Cargill or Stephen Goranson. Indirect contact includes participation in any discussion group, blogs, chat rooms or the like, or communications by e-mail, on the internet, relating to the Dead Sea Scrolls or Qumran, except under the use of his own name, Raphael Golb, or anonymously, as denominated by the appellation, "anonymous." The use of any other names for this purpose, whether fictitious, invented, historical or the like, constitutes indirect contact with the protected parties, as that term is used herein.

Three: The defendant may not solicit, request, command, aid, or attempt to cause another person (a) to act in violation of this Order of Protection, or (b) to contact Professor Lawrence Schiffman, Professor Robert Cargill or

- 1	Stephen Goranson.
2	I have no problem with an Order of Protection
3	against the gentleman whose name he did not use as in
4	contacting other people, but I decline to put him in the
5	special conditions. I don't think that would be
6	appropriate. That's Dr. Gibson.
7	The fees and assessments are imposed and I am sure
8	you will advise your client of his rights.
9	I decline to stay sentence.
10	MR. KUBY: Excuse me, Judge. I am sorry, it's a
11	small matter, but we did not make an application for a stay
12	of sentence.
13	Prior to your imposition of sentence Mr.
14	Breitbart requested a voluntary surrender date, which I
15	take it, you have declined to provide. We did not request
16	a stay.
17	It's a small matter, but we requested a stay, but
18	not from this Court.
19	THE COURT: I gather from somebody who knows less
20	about it.
21	MR. KUBY: Thank you, Judge.
22	THE COURT: I am sorry. I stand corrected. I did
23	not hear from Mr. Golb.
24	MR. KUBY: We would have indicated that he did not
25	want to address the Court.
	i '

THE DEFENDANT: If I could make a statement.

THE COURT: He still has the right and I was so distracted I made an error, and I should before we finally sign off on anything give him a chance.

Anything you would like to say, Mr. Golb.

THE DEFENDANT: This is just a statement that I prepared to read.

THE COURT: Whenever you would like, Mr. Golb.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, obviously, I'm sorry for all the wounding of feelings that my e-mail antics have caused. I have a brief statement.

I read through the transcripts, and I wondered if my testimony may have led to a misapprehension that I somehow intended these e-mails to be in the nature of light-hearted comedy. I'm troubled by the notion of humor, because especially in the world of e-mails, one man's joke is another's mortal insult. The definitions that I had in mind when I said that I had used the techniques of irony, satire and parody, are the following -- I quote from Merriam Webster's online page of these terms.

- 1. A literary work holding up human vices and follies to ridicule or scorn.
- 2. Trenchant wit, irony, or sarcasm used to expose and discredit vice or folly.

See also the Random House Dictionary.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

- 1. The use of irony, sarcasm, ridicule, or the like, in exposing, denouncing or deriding vice, folly, et cetera.
- 2. A literary composition, in verse or prose, in which human folly and vice are held up to scorn, derision, or ridicule.

And in a publication of the University of
Victoria, I read: "Satire arouses laughter or scorn as a
means of ridicule and derision, with the avowed intention
of correcting human faults. Common targets of satire
include individuals ('personal satire'), types of people,
social groups, institutions, and human nature."

And so I want to also address the question of the definition of parody and sarcasm that was used in which a element of humor seemed to be prominent, and I have trouble with that.

I also want to apologize for being less specific than I should have been during my testimony about my understanding of the word "impersonate." I have since looked the verb up and I find two definitions. One is the equivalent of criminal impersonation, as in impersonating a policeman, and the other refers to the type of impersonation that is commonly engaged in by entertainers or by people like the Yes Men or the Canadian radio show due who impersonated Nicolas Sarkozy on the telephone with

Sarah Palin, and she actually believed she was talking with the French president.

So my point in my testimony was that, in my view, I had not impersonated Lawrence Schiffman in the criminal sense, but that I had engaged in the same kind of ironical speech act that many others have engaged in the past. For example, in the famous Danny Hellman case, the Court referred to the e-mail parodies involved there as an "act of literary impersonation." Allow me to point out that e-mails are letters, and that letters are literary artifacts. The words "letter" and "literature" both come from the same Latin term.

Before this case, I did not know that satirical hoaxes of the sort were treated as crimes in the United States of America, but as this Court said, ignorance of the law is not an excuse. At any rate, what I meant to explain was that in my mind, the question involved in this case was whether the state has a compelling interest in criminalizing undeclared parodies in which the author of the verbal act uses the name of the individual he's lampooning to achieve his purpose. Or does this really come down to the same things as harm to reputation. As when we say, "my good name is at stake." I don't know the answer to that question, but this Court has ruled, I respect that ruling, and I can only say that if I have

indeed violated the law, then I'm terribly sorry and obviously have no choice but to accept whatever the consequences are for me. But I do believe that this is no ordinary case, and that it defines a fundamental set of choices that face all of us in the years ahead. So I'm glad I've litigated it, and I hope the fact that I choose to do so won't be taken against me.

THE COURT: Okay.

Well, it's a very interesting problem. Mr. Golb, you know, of course, I looked up satire and parody in the course of preparing my instructions to the jury, but then I never used it, though they had asked me to use it, and I asked myself not to, it assumes the conclusion. There are certain elements to the crime.

So you recall that I instructed about imitators such as Tina Fay and what their intent might or might not be.

As to the Canadian fellow who imitated so-called Sarah Palin, I have no comment on whether he is prosecutable. But, you know, you assume the conclusion and you just go ahead and what the jury found and what the evidence supports is the criminal intent which brought you a parody over the line, and that is, I guess, the reason I despair over supervision because you seem to believe that you were carrying a banner for the First Amendment and what

1	you were doing is a form of yelling fire in that crowded
2	theatre.
3	I am adhering to the previously imposed sentence.
4	I take it, you have advised your client of his
5	appellate rights?
6	MR. KUBY: That's correct, Judge.
7	THE COURT: Bail exonerated.
8	***
9	Certified to be a true and accurate transcription
10	of the minutes taken in the above-captioned matter.
11	(I M
12	A Me
13	THERESA MAGNICCARI
14	Senior Court Reporter
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	